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Abstract
Background: A variety of approaches have been used to contain escalating hospital costs. One
approach is intensifying price competition. The increase in price based competition, which changes
the incentives hospitals face, coupled with the fact that consumers can more easily evaluate the
quality of hotel services compared with the quality of clinical care, may lead hospitals to allocate
more resources into hotel rather than clinical services.
Methods: To test this hypothesis we studied hospitals in California in 1982 and 1989, comparing
resource allocations prior to and following selective contracting, a period during which the focus
of competition changed from quality to price. We estimated the relationship between clinical
outcomes, measured as risk-adjusted-mortality rates, and resources.
Results: In 1989, higher competition was associated with lower clinical expenditures levels
compared with 1982. The trend was stronger for non-profit hospitals. Lower clinical resource use
was associated with worse risk adjusted mortality outcomes.
Conclusions: This study raises concerns that cost reductions may be associated with increased
mortality.
Introduction
The last two decades brought about fundamental changes
in the organization and delivery of medical services in the
United States as payers seek to control the escalation in
health care expenditures. Policies addressing these issues
have been of two types. The first relies on containing costs
through control of the prices paid to providers, beginning
with the Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospitals
in 1983, Resource Based Relative Value Units (RBRVUs)
payment for physicians in 1992 and the most recently im-
plemented prospective payment for nursing homes. Such
prospective payment systems provide the same incentives
to cut costs to all providers, irrespective of the markets in
which they are located and the competitiveness of their
markets. The other relies on changing the focus of compe-
tition among health care providers, from quality based
competition [1] to price based competition [2].
These policy changes were successful in bringing about a
deceleration in hospital revenues and expenditures
growth [2,3]. Little is known, however, about what specif-
ic strategies hospitals adopted and the impact these strat-
egies may have had on the quality of care patients receive.
Previous studies [4] found that hospitals increased effi-
ciency in all clinical services following selective contract-
ing in California. California hospitals also tended to
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specialize and differentiate themselves from similar hos-
pitals in response to competitive pressures [5]. A similar
response, of increased specialization, was observed for a
national sample of hospitals following implementation
of PPS [6].
In this paper we study another potential strategy that hos-
pitals may adopt and which has not been addressed in the
literature to-date. We investigate the hypothesis that hos-
pitals in an increasingly price competitive environment,
shift resources from activities related to clinical services,
which are not easily observed and evaluated by patients,
into hotel services which are easily observed. We study
hospitals in California, comparing resource allocation
during a regime dominated by quality competition and a
regime dominated by price competition. We then exam-
ine the association between risk adjusted excess hospital
mortality and resource use in clinical services, to investi-
gate the potential impact on quality of medical care and
health outcomes.
Competition in California in the 1980s: a case study
The implementation of selective contracting in California
in 1982 offers a unique natural experiment to study the re-
sponse of hospitals to changes in the nature of competi-
tion. Unlike other health care markets, in which the
change from quality to price based competition was grad-
ual, driven by continuously increasing penetration of
managed care, and often time confounded by other secu-
lar trends, the California legislation changed market con-
ditions very rapidly for all hospitals in the state by
permitting all health plans for the first time to contract
with only a subset of hospitals. It thus allows a pre/post
study design: hospitals resource allocation decisions dur-
ing the quality competition regime (pre period) can be
compared to decisions made during the price competition
regime (post period). This natural experiment allows us to
test the hypothesis that changes in the nature of competi-
tion are more likely to be associated with a shift of re-
sources from clinical to hotel activities (and a
concomitant deterioration in mortality outcomes) in
more competitive hospital markets. As the level of hospi-
tal competition has not changed during the period (the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) remained stable in
all markets), this test is limited to the change in the nature
of competition and is not confounded by the impact of
changes in the level of competition on resource allocation
decisions.
During the same time period, California hospitals were
also subject for the first time to price regulation, due to
implementation of the Medicare PPS. While PPS also pro-
vided hospitals with incentives to lower their costs, it did
so in a distinctively different manner than price competi-
tion. The PPS set the price per discharge hospitals were
paid, thus creating incentives to lower costs, irrespective
of market structure (7). The intensity of price based com-
petition, on the other hand, is highly sensitive to the com-
petitiveness of the hospital market. The analytical strategy
of this paper is based on this distinction.
Hospital competition, quality, resource allocation and 
health outcomes
Competition focused on prices, as is often the case in mar-
kets dominated by managed care, creates incentives to in-
crease efficiency and possibly curtail resource use. With
the exception of possible increases in administrative activ-
ities designed to contain costs in other areas (e.g. billing
and utilization review) or to increase marketing efforts,
such incentives to cut costs are likely to affect all aspects of
hospital activities.
Hospitals may also compete on quality, both quality of
medical services and quality of hotel services and ameni-
ties. The importance of competition for quality is likely to
be greater in markets in which hospitals compete for pa-
tients directly, as they do for all fee-for-service patients
and for those enrolled in HMOs that offer a choice of hos-
pitals within their market. Furthermore, to the extent that
HMOs make their contracting decisions based on benefi-
ciary hospital preferences, perceptions of quality are im-
portant competitive tools.
Competition for quality [1], unlike competition for price
[2], may lead to increased costs. Furthermore, it may affect
clinical and hotel services differently. In markets where
patients' choice of hospitals are increasingly important,
hospitals are likely to compete more on quality attributes
that patients observe and value. Given the difficulty that
patients have in directly determining the quality of medi-
cal care they receive, and the relative ease with which they
can evaluate the quality of hotel services (e.g. condition of
the facility, quality of food) hospitals face incentives to
shift resources from clinical activities to amenities. On the
other hand, if patients rely on their physician's recom-
mendations in choosing hospitals [8], and to the degree
that physicians can assess clinical quality, albeit imper-
fectly, hospitals are faced with counter incentives, incen-
tives that would promote resource use in clinical activities
rather than hotel services. As a result, hospitals may face
conflicting incentives: incentives to maintain or enhance
the quality of hotel services on the one hand, and incen-
tives to maintain activities that contribute to the quality of
clinical care and health outcomes on the other. The actual
choices that hospitals make about resource allocation de-
pend on the relative strength of these opposing incentives.
A model of changes in resource allocation
As the main hypothesis of interest is that the change in the
nature of competition was associated with changes in hos-BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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pital resource allocations, the model we hypothesize al-
lows the marginal effects of market and hospital
characteristics (Xt) on resource allocation (Yt), as meas-
ured by the coefficients in a regression model (β t), to vary
over time:
(1)   Yt = α t + β tXt + ε t
The models we estimated were difference models of the
form
(2)   ∆ Y = ∆α  + ∆β  * X0 + β t * ∆ X + ∆ε
where ∆  is the difference between year t and the base year,
indicated by t = 0. From (2) it follows that β t, the vector of
coefficients multiplying the change variables, measures
the marginal effect of the variable in the end year, while
∆β , the vector of coefficients multiplying the level varia-
bles, measures the change in the marginal effect. The mar-
ginal relationship in year 0 is given by β 0 = β t - ∆β ..
Methods
Sample
The initial sample included all 338 acute care hospitals in
California that were in operation during both 1982 and
1989. Of those, 18 (5.3%) were excluded from the re-
source allocation analyses and 8 (2.4%) were excluded
from the mortality analyses, because of incomplete data.
Data sources
Financial, ownership and utilization data were obtained
from the Hospital Annual Financial Disclosure Reports,
filed annually by all California hospitals with the Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).
Risk adjusted mortality data were obtained from the
Medicare Hospital Information Report published by the
Health Care Financing Administration [9].
Variable definitions
I. Resource allocation variables
Resource allocation was measured by expenditures per ad-
justed discharge. Adjusted discharges are a composite
measure of input designed to account for both inpatient
discharges and outpatient visits, using the methodology
developed by the American Hospital Association.
Expenditures per adjusted discharge were calculated sepa-
rately for three categories: clinical, hotel and administra-
tive services. Expenditures were aggregated by cost center,
with each cost center assigned to one of the three services.
The table in the Additional File: Appendix lists all hospital
cost centers and their assignment to hotel, clinical and ad-
ministrative categories. The dependent variables in the re-
source allocation analyses were defined as the differences
in expenditures per adjusted discharge, between 1989 and
1982, for each of the three categories.
II. Quality variables
The dependent variables for the analyses of quality of clin-
ical care were excess death rates from all causes and from
4 specific medical conditions that have relatively high
death rates: acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart
failure, pneumonia and stroke. We included in the analy-
ses measures based on cause specific mortality in addition
to overall mortality because prior studies [10] have shown
that these measures tend to be uncorrelated, and that hos-
pitals performing well in one clinical area do not necessar-
ily perform well in others. Measures based on overall
mortality may therefore be biased towards zero, showing
less variation compared with cause specific measures.
Excess mortality was defined as the difference between the
observed mortality rate for the hospital and a predicted,
risk adjusted mortality rate. Observed and predicted mor-
tality rates were obtained from the Medicare Hospital Re-
ports [9]. They are based on Medicare discharges and
include all deaths within 30 days of admission, irrespec-
tive of the location of death. The risk adjustment method-
ology used by the Health Care Financing Administration,
incorporates individual patients' age, gender, specific di-
agnoses and comorbidities, admission source, emergency
or elective admission and the patient's risk group based
on hospitalizations during the preceding 6 months [9].
III. Independent variables
Competition was measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), defined as the sum of squared market shares
of all hospitals competing in the same area. Hospital mar-
ket areas and the HHI were calculated based on all payer
zip code level patient flows, as described in Zwanziger et
al. [11].
To control for financial pressures hospitals may have been
experiencing in addition to competition, we included var-
iables measuring bad debt and charity as percent of total
revenues and percent occupancy. To control for potential
economies of scale the estimated models included total
clinical standard units of measures reported in the Califor-
nia Financial Disclosure Reports. Ownership indicator
variables included for-profit, not-for profit public, and
not-for profit district ownership. The omitted category
was private not-for profit hospitals. Teaching status was
defined as hospitals with some residents. All payer DRG-
based case mix index was included to account for differ-
ences in patients' severity. Median family income meas-
ured for the hospital's zip code area was included to
capture demand effects and as a proxy for cross sectional
wage variations.BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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Analyses
We estimated regression models in which change in ex-
penditures per adjusted discharge and excess mortality in
1989 were the dependent variables. Because all models
were heteroskedastic, all reported tests of significance are
based on White's robust standard errors [12]. The Ramsey
RESET test for specification errors [13] was applied to all
models to rule out the need for non-linear and interaction
terms.
The mortality models were weighted by the inverse of the
standard error for the predicted mortality rate, to account
for differences across hospitals in the accuracy of the ex-
cess mortality measures, which are due to differences in
sample sizes [14].
Since initial analyses indicated different associations (dif-
ferent β s) for for-profit and non-profit hospitals, we esti-
mated fully interacted models, in which all variables were
interacted with for-profit status. The hypotheses of signif-
icant marginal effect were therefore tested for the non-
profit hospitals by a t test of the main effect and for the
for-profit hospital by an F test of the linear restriction that
the sum of the coefficients of the main and interaction ef-
fect are zero.
Results
Description of sample hospitals
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the hospitals in-
cluded in the study. The majority of hospitals (52.6%)
were private non-profit with the second largest group
(26.0%) being for-profit institutions. Fifteen point four
percent were teaching hospitals. The average hospital size
did not change significantly over the 1982–1989 period,
remaining at 190–200 beds. Occupancies declined signif-
icantly, from an average of 62.3% to 55.2%, and inpatient
case mix increased significantly from 1.17 to 1.27, indicat-
ing that hospitals were treating sicker and more expensive
patients at the end of the period. Both total expenditures
and expenditures per adjusted discharge increased signifi-
cantly.
The degree of competition among hospitals has not
changed between 1982 and 1989. The HHI of around 0.3
suggests that competition was limited. (Markets with HHI
values below 0.18 are considered moderately or very com-
petitive [15]). The large variation in the HHI, however, in-
dicates that many hospitals were located in competitive
markets, with 25% of hospitals in markets with HHI be-
low 0.17.
Overall mortality rates averaged 10%. Average observed
and predicted rates were very similar, but the variation in
rates was higher for the observed rates compared with the
predicted rates, suggesting substantial variations in excess
mortality and quality across the sample.
Resource allocation changes
Table 2 reports the mean values for the dependent and in-
dependent variables included in the multivariate regres-
sions. Table 3 reports results by ownership – for-profit
and non-profit. These results are based on a fully interact-
ed model estimated over pooled data by ownership. All
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Beds
1982 193 154
1989 199 150
Expenditures ('000)
1982 16,323 16,901
1989 28,210*** 30,221
Expenditures per adjusted discharge
1982 2,568 898
1989 4,214*** 1,547
Occupancy (%)
1982 62.3 15.2
1989 55.2*** 16.9
Inpatient all payers case mix index
1983 1.17 0.22
1989 1.27*** 0.28
Ownership (%)
For profit 26.0
Non profit 74.0
private 52.6
public 6.6
district 14.8
Teaching (%) 15.4
Mortality – all causes 1989
Observed rate 10% 3%
Predicted rate 10% 2%
AMI mortality 1989
Observed rate 28% 14%
Predicted rate 27% 4%
CHF mortality 1989
Observed rate 16% 7%
Predicted rate 15% 2%
Pneumonia mortality 1989
Observed rate 16% 7%
Predicted rate 16% 2%
Stroke mortality 1989
Observed rate 21% 10%
Predicted rate 21% 3%
Competition (HHI)
1982 0.31 0.16
1989 0.30 0.16
Significantly different from 1982: *0.05 ≤  p < 0.1, **0.001 ≤  p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.001BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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models were highly significant (p < 0.01). The clinical
services model explained 51% of the variation in expendi-
tures per adjusted discharge, while the hotel and adminis-
trative services models explained 24% and 26%
respectively.
Effect of competition
Table 5 presents the marginal effect of competition, calcu-
lated from the regression results and using equations 2
and 3, for 1982 and 1989, as well as the change in these
coefficients between the two years. (Note that the regres-
sion coefficients for the HHI variable were multiplied by -
1 in table 5, such that a positive association means that ex-
penditures per discharge increase with increased competi-
tion.)
Non-profit hospitals in more competitive areas had high-
er expenditures per adjusted discharge in all three catego-
ries in all years. The marginal effect was highest in clinical
areas and lowest in administrative services. It declined sig-
nificantly over time in both clinical and hotel services, but
not in administrative services. The decline was almost
three times as large in the clinical services compared with
hotel services. By 1989, while the marginal effect of com-
petition on expenditures in these services was still posi-
tive, it was no longer significantly different from zero.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the
focus of competition on quality in 1982 has diminished
significantly over the seven-year period we studied.
The results for for-profit hospitals present a different pic-
ture. First, the association between expenditures per ad-
justed discharge and competition was statically significant
only for administrative services. This association was also
by far the strongest. It was negative, indicating that hospi-
tals in more competitive markets spent less per discharge
on administrative activities. The marginal effect was
slightly smaller in 1989, suggesting that hospitals in more
competitive areas may have reallocated resources into ad-
ministrative services. They may have, for example, invest-
ed in better information and management systems that
would allow them to better control costs.
The association between competition and resource use
was negative in clinical services and positive in hotel serv-
ices. This is consistent with the hypothesis that for-profit
hospitals compete on quality in those areas that can be
easily observed by patients, namely hotel services, and cut
back on resources in clinical services, where quality is
more difficult for patients to evaluate directly. The change
over the 1982 through 1989 period is also consistent with
this hypothesis: the negative association between compe-
tition and clinical resources increased in 1989 as did the
positive association between hotel resources and compe-
tition. The lack of significance of the associations may re-
flect the smaller number of for-profit hospitals in the
sample and the resulting lower statistical power. (There
were 83 for-profit hospitals and 13 independent variables,
compared with 237 non-profit hospitals.)
Other hospital and market characteristics
The strongest and most consistent relationship was be-
tween all payer case mix and expenditures per adjusted
discharge in all categories (see table 3). The association
was substantially stronger for the clinical category and in
non-profit compared with for-profit hospitals.
Most other variables either exhibited no significant asso-
ciations or no clear patterns. There were no significant dif-
ferences in resource allocations by ownership. Teaching
status was positively associated with clinical and hotel ex-
penditures among the non-profit hospitals but exhibited
a negative association among the for-profit hospitals. Per-
cent bad debt and charity and percent occupancy had no
significant relationship with expenditures among the
non-profit but were associated with lower clinical and ad-
ministrative expenditures among the for-profit hospitals.
Median family income was associated with higher ex-
penditure levels for all services among the non-profit hos-
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of variables included in 
the multivariate analyses
Dependent Variables Mean 
Value
Standard 
Deviation
Change in expenditures/adjusted dis-
charge
Clinical services 1030.27 698.44
Hotel services 222.62 233.40
Administrative services 393.18 316.90
Excess mortality: (1989)
All causes 0.67 1.9
AMI 1.44 13.6
CHF 0.50 7.1
Pneumonia 0.57 6.4
Stroke 0.78 9.5
HHI (1982) 0.306 0.164
Change in HHI (1989–1982) -0.002 0.044
% bad debt and charity (1982) 3.90 4.46
Change in % bed 5.06 9.04
% occupancy (1982) 62.3 15.2
Change in % occupancy -7.05 13.5
Case mix index (1983) 1.17 0.22
Change in case mix index 0.10 0.14
SUMs (1982) ('000) 184 173
Change in SUMs -11.4 49.8
Median family income ('000) 38.2 9.5BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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pital, but only with the clinical services among the for-
profits.
Risk adjusted excess mortality
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions modeling the
association between excess mortality (defined as the dif-
ference between observed and predicted mortality rate)
and clinical expenditures per adjusted discharge, competi-
tion, ownership, and teaching status. The models ex-
plained between 1% and 5% of the variation in excess
mortality. In all cases there was a negative association be-
tween clinical expenditure levels and excess mortality, im-
plying that increased resources were associated with better
mortality outcomes. This relationship was present for
mortality from all causes as well as from the four specific
causes, and was statistically significant at the 0.10 level or
better.
Table 6 shows the increase in excess mortality that is asso-
ciated with a decrease of 1 standard deviation (SD) in clin-
ical expenditures per adjusted discharge, based on the
estimated regression coefficients. For comparison, the ta-
Table 3: Expenditures per adjusted Discharge – Multivariate regression results
Clinical Hotel Administrative
A: Main effects Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
HHI – 1982 436** 0.018 151** 0.026 -43 0.636
Change in HHI -676 0.222 -291 0.176 -252 0.405
Case mix – 1983 863*** 0.000 114** 0.026 193*** 0.009
Change in case mix 2483*** 0.000 642*** 0.000 609*** 0.000
For profit 515 0.350 209 0.281 207 0.511
Public -9.8 0.932 -21 0.630 -19 0.738
District 1.3 0.986 11 0.691 18 0.504
Teaching 33 0.665 46* 0.098 95* 0.058
SUM – 1982 ('000) 1.0*** 0.000 -0.02 0.741 0.1 0.213
Change in SUM ('000) 1.7*** 0.002 -0.3 0.849 0.03 0.909
Occupancy – 1982 -3.0 0.214 0.1 0.863 -0.5 0.643
Change in occupancy -0.05 0.985 -0.2 0.826 -1.1 0.340
Bad debt & charity – 1982 1.3 0.874 -1.1 0.492 -3.4 0.195
Change in bad debt & charity 2.7 0.589 -0.1 0.967 -0.6 0.721
Median family income 13.4*** 0.000 4.3*** 0.000 3.7*** 0.008
Clinical Hotel Administrative
B: For-profit interaction effects Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
HHI – 1982 -333 0.411 -275* 0.074 -103 0.677
Change in HHI 1014 0.346 -369 0.593 1900** 0.036
Case mix – 1983 -225 0.341 -48 0.609 17 0.899
Change in case mix -506 0.218 -224 0.216 -398* 0.088
Teaching -292 0.145 -235** 0.016 -28 0.783
SUM – 1982 ('000) -0.7 0.392 -0.4 0.275 0.2 0.624
Change in SUM ('000) -2.8 0.130 -0.5 0.475 -0.8 0.341
Occupancy – 1982 -0.8 0.891 2.1 0.336 -4.5 0.221
Change in occupancy -3.9 0.505 1.1 0.669 -10*** 0.001
Bad debt & charity – 1982 -7.9 0.751 -18.4 0.197 24* 0.078
Change in bad debt & charity -46 0.004*** 1.1 0.866 -16* 0.079
Median family income 1.4 0.812 -1.8 0.530 -0.5 0.887
N 322 319 320
F value 13.5*** 4.8*** 5.1***
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.24 0.26
*Significant at the 0.1 level **Significant at the 0.05 level ***Significant at the 0.01 levelBMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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ble also provides the magnitude of 1 SD in excess mortal-
ity among the study hospitals. In all cases, the effect of a 1
SD in resources was less than a 1 SD in excess mortality.
As expected due to the potential bias towards zero in the
measures based on all causes, the associations were larger
for the cause specific measures.
As discussed earlier, we hypothesized that competition
may affect quality, including clinical quality, not only
through its impact on resource use but also due to incen-
tives to compete on quality. If indeed hospitals were com-
peting on clinical quality, the association between the
HHI and excess mortality, controlling for resource use,
should have been positive and significant. In all cases, ex-
cept for pneumonia, we did not find a significant relation-
ship. In most cases there was also no significant
relationship between ownership or teaching status and ex-
cess mortality.
Discussion
In this paper we present a test of the hypothesis that
changes in the nature of competition among California
hospitals, resulting from selective contracting, were asso-
ciated with changes in hospitals' resource allocation deci-
sions. We find empirical evidence to suggest that resources
have been shifted from clinical activities (which are not
observed by patients) and into hotel services (which are
more readily observable). These changes in resource allo-
cation tended to be larger in hospitals located in more
competitive areas. As the level of competition has not
changed during the study period, the change in hospital
behavior is likely to be a response to the change in the na-
ture of competition.
Table 4: Risk adjusted excess mortality – Multivariate Regression Results
All Cases AMI Congestive Heart 
Failure
Pneumonia Stroke
Coeffi-
cient
P value Coeffi-
cient
P value Coeffi-
cient
P value Coeffi-
cient
P value Coeffi-
cient
P value
Expenditures per 
adjusted dis-
charge – 1989 
('000)
-0.47*** 0.000 -2.1** 0.026 -1.1*** 0.009 -0.43 0.332 -1.4** 0.026
HHI – 1989 -0.39 0.646 -3.9 0.482 2.6 0.406 -4.5* 0.077 -4.1 0.304
For Profit -0.15 0.498 5.4*** 0.006 -0.94 0.274 -0.40 0.653 -1.6 0.152
Public 0.73 0.187 2.2 0.530 -1.9 0.306 -0.36 0.862 8.1 0.174
District -0.34 0.479 -3.6 0.111 -0.04 0.980 -2.2* 0.060 -1.0 0.556
Teaching Hospi-
tals
-0.03 0.899 -1.5 0.457 -0.81 0.355 0.51 0.661 -2.5 0.286
N 330 326 329 329 328
F value 4.54*** 2.71** 2.44** 1.33 1.57
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05
*Significant at the 0.1 level **Significant at the 0.05 level ***Significant at the 0.01 level
Table 5: Marginal effect of competition on Expenditures per ad-
justed discharge (Positive values indicate increase with increased 
competition)
Non profit hospitals
Clinical Hotel Adminis-
tration
1982 1112* 442* 209
1989 676 291 252
Change 1989–1982 -436** -151** 43
For profit hospitals
Clinical Hotel Adminis-
tration
1982 -235 536 -1794**
1989 -338 660 -1648*
Change 1989–1982 -103 124 146
*Significant at the 0.1 level **Significant at the 0.05 level ***Significant at 
the 0.01 levelBMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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The relationship between resource allocation and compe-
tition differed by ownership. For-profit hospitals in more
competitive areas had lower expenditures levels compared
with those in less competitive areas. Among non-profit
hospitals, we found the opposite – clinical expenditures
per adjusted discharge increased with competition. The
trend over time, however, even though it was much
stronger among the non-profit hospitals, was the same for
both types. For both, the change in the marginal effect of
competition (∆β ) was negative. As a result, the positive as-
sociation between competition and clinical resource use
among non-profit hospitals diminished and the negative
association among the for-profit hospitals increased.
The analyses of excess mortality demonstrate that clinical
quality, at least as measured here, is positively associated
with the amount of resources used in producing clinical
services. Therefore, policies that create incentives for hos-
pitals to limit resource use are likely to have an impact on
health outcomes. Furthermore, as clinical quality is not
easily observable by consumers, leading to disparity in in-
centives to provide hotel and clinical quality, more com-
petitive areas are likely to experience a larger relative
decline in resources allocated to clinical activities and
hence worse mortality outcomes.
The impact on health outcomes in non-profit hospitals
may not be as large as it might have been because expend-
iture levels were curtailed not only in clinical areas, but in
hotel services as well, although to a much lesser degree.
This strategy spread the burden of cost containment ef-
forts beyond clinical activities. If non-profit hospitals
would have concentrated all their cost cutting efforts in
clinical services, as did the for-profit hospitals, the impact
on costs, and potentially on mortality outcomes, would
have been 35% higher (see table 4).
The generalizability of the findings presented here is lim-
ited in several ways. First, quality was measured only in
terms of excess mortality. While this is an important as-
pect of quality, it is likely to be an insensitive measure. Be-
cause measures based on mortality do not tend to be
correlated with measures based on other outcomes [16],
such as complications, one cannot deduce from this study
that other aspects of clinical quality have been affected
similarly by the changes in competition during the period.
Furthermore, the mortality models we estimated, unlike
the expenditures models, were cross sectional and are
therefore subject to the usual concerns about potential
bias due to omitted hospital specific effects. It should be
noted, however, that the models did include the variables
most likely to be associated with excess mortality – patient
level risks, expenditures, competition, ownership and
teaching status. It should also be noted that while our
findings with respect to changes in resource allocation are
based on total expenditures, thus reflecting care for all pa-
tients, the mortality outcomes are based on the experience
of Medicare patients only. Prior studies, however, suggest
that patient care given by same provider does not vary by
payer status [17–19].
A more important generalizability question arises due to
the sample selected for this study – namely hospitals lo-
cated only in California during the 1980s. Can the behav-
ior of hospitals observed in this local and during this time
period be assumed to generalize to other markets and oth-
er times? While the magnitude of the effects we measure
in this study are clearly not generalizable, the directions of
the effects are likely to transcend time and place, as they
reflect basic behavioral responses to market incentives in
accordance with theory. While this sample selection may
be viewed as a limitation of this study, it is also its
strength. By focusing on a period in which levels of com-
petition were stable and where the change in the nature of
competition can be traced to a specific legislative act, this
study is able to test for the differential impact of price vs.
quality competition, without confounding by other fac-
tors.
Conclusion
In summary, the results of this study should be viewed as
raising a cautionary question: are the hospital cost reduc-
tions that have been observed in California [20] and na-
tionally [21] associated with increased mortality?
Table 6: Increase in excess mortality rates associated with 1 standard deviation decrease in clinical expenditures per adjusted discharge
All Causes AMI CHF Pneumonia Stroke
Increase in excess mortality rate due to 1 SD decrease in clinical expenditures/
adjusted discharge (Deaths per 100 discharges)
0.82 3.28 1.96 1.16 1.44
1 SD in excess mortality rate in sample hospitals (Deaths per 100 discharges) 1.87 13.6 7.06 6.42 9.52BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/10
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